PRIVILEGES OF THE HOUSE—CALLING ON PRESIDENT TO ABSTAIN FROM RENEGOTIATING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS GOVERNING ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES

Mr. WISE. Mr. Speaker, I rise to a question of the privileges of the House, and I offer a privileged resolution, that I noticed pursuant to rule IX, and ask for its immediate consideration.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the resolution.

The Clerk read as follows:

RESOLUTION CALLING ON THE PRESIDENT TO ABSTAIN FROM RENEGOTIATING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS GOVERNING ANTI-DUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES

Whereas under Art. I, Section 8 of the Constitution, the Congress has power and responsibility with regard to foreign commerce and the conduct of international trade negotiations:

Whereas the House of Representatives is deeply concerned that, in connection with the World Trade Organization ("WTO") Ministerial meeting to be held in Seattle, Washington, and the multilateral trade negotiations expected to follow, a few countries are seeking to circumvent the agreed list of negotiation topics and reopen debate over the WTO's antidumping and antisubsidy rules;

Whereas the Congress has not approved new negotiations on antidumping or antisubsidy rules and has clearly, but so far informally, signaled its opposition to such negotiations;

Whereas strong antidumping and antisubsidy rules are a cornerstone of the liberal trade policy of the United States and are essential to the health of the manufacturing and farm sectors in the United States;

Whereas it has long been and remains the policy of the United States to support its antidumping and antisubsidy laws and to defend those laws in international negotiations;

Whereas, under present circumstances, launching a negotiation that includes antidumping and antisubsidy issues would affect the rights of the House and the integrity of its proceedings;

Wheereas the WTO antidumping and antisubsidy rules concluded in the Uruguay Round have scarcely been tested since they entered into effect and certainly have not proved defective:

Whereas opening these rules to renegotiation could only lead to weakening them, which would in turn lead to even greater abuse of the world's open markets, particularly that of the United States;

Whereas conversely, avoiding another divisive fight over these rules is the best way to promote progress on the other, far more important, issues facing WTO members; and

Whereas it is therefore essential that negotiations on these antidumping and antisubsidy matters not be reopened under the auspices of the WTO or otherwise: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the House of Representatives calls upon the President—

(1) not to participate in any international negotiation in which antidumping or antisubsidy rules are part of the negotiating agenda:

(2) to refrain from submitting for congressional approval agreements that require changes to the current antidumping and countervailing duty laws and enforcement policies of the United States; and

(3) to enforce the antidumping and countervailing duty laws vigorously in all pending and future cases.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hansen). The Chair will entertain brief argument as to whether the resolution constitutes a question of privilege.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from West Virginia (Mr. WISE).

Mr. WISE. Mr. Speaker, this resolution I attempt to bring up calls on the President to abstain from renegotiating international agreements governing antidumping and countervailing measures.

The arguments I make are very simple. According to article I, section 8 of the Constitution, the Congress has the power and the responsibility relating to foreign commerce and the conduct of international trade negotiations. An important part of Congress' participation in the formulation of trade policy is the enactment of official negotiating objectives against which completed agreements can be measured when presented for ratification.

This Congress, in 1994, ratified an agenda for the Seattle World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference that is about to take place, and that agenda included only agricultural trade services, trade, and intellectual property protection. The agenda, specifically enacted into Federal law as Public Law 103–465, did not include antidumping or antisubsidy rules.

What Congress is concerned about here is that a few countries are seeking to circumvent the agreed list of negotiating topics and open debate over the WTO's antidumping and antisubsidy rules, most notably applied to steel in the past few months. The Congress has not approved new negotiations on these—

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

Mr. KOLBE. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Speaker. Is it in order for the gentleman to speak beyond the matter of whether or not this is a matter of personal privilege?

Mr. WISE. The Chair asked for arguments, and I am responding to the Chair

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The debate should be confined to whether or not this constitutes a question of privilege under rule IX.

Mr. WISE. Then I will happily deal directly with the gentleman's response. Incidentally, the 10,000 steelworkers who have been laid off in this country would like to have this matter brought up, but I will deal with the narrow approach that the gentleman requests.

Section 702 of House rule IX, entitled "General Principles," concludes that certain matters of business arising under the Constitution, mandatory in nature, have been held to have a privilege which supersedes the rules establishing the order of business. And, Mr. Speaker, before I was interrupted, I was making those points about those rules which cannot be superseded.

This is a question of the House's constitutional authority and is, therefore, privileged in nature. The WTO antidumping and antisubsidy rules concluded in the Uruguay Round have scarcely been tested since they have been entered into effect and have certainly not been proven effective. Opening these rules to negotiation only leads to weakening them, which in turn leads to even greater abuse of the world's markets.

There is precedent for bringing H. Res. 298 out of committee and to the House floor immediately. For instance, H. Con. Res. 190 was brought to the floor on October 26 under suspension of the rules because it concerned the upcoming Seattle Round, and this measure only had 13 cosponsors, while our comeasure has 228 cosponsors. The majority of this House should be heard.

And, as I point out, thousands of steelworkers from Weirton to Wheeling to Follensbee, who have been laid off during the course of these antidumping and antisubsidy rules not being effectively applied, are saying now to the President, please do not step back and please do not weaken them any further. Stand up for workers in this country. That is the grounds upon which I assert the privilege.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Are there any other Members that want to be heard on this point?

If not, the Chair is prepared to rule on whether the resolution offered by the gentleman from West Virginia (Mr. WISE) is a question of the privileges of the House under rule IX.

The resolution offered by the gentleman from West Virginia calls upon the President to address a trade imbalance in the area of imports. Specifically, the resolution calls upon the President to refrain from participation in certain international negotiations, to refrain from submitting certain agreements to the Congress, and to vigorously enforce the trade laws.

As the Chair stated on October 10. 1998, and earlier today, a resolution expressing the legislative sentiment that the President should take specific action to achieve a desired public policy end does not present a question affecting the rights of the House, collectively, its safety, dignity, or the integrity of its proceeding within the meanings of rule IX. In the opinion of the Chair, the resolution offered by the gentleman from West Virginia is purely a legislative proposition properly initiated by introduction through the hopper under clause 7, rule XII, to be subsequently considered under the normal rules of the House.

Accordingly, the resolution offered by the gentleman from West Virginia does not constitute a question of the privileges of the House under rule IX, and may not be considered at this time.

Mr. WISE. Mr. Speaker, I appeal the ruling of the Chair, and ask to be heard on the ruling.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is. Shall the decision of the Chair stand as the judgment of the House?

MOTION TO TABLE OFFERED BY MR. KOLBE

Mr. KOLBE. Mr. Speaker, I move to lay the appeal on the table.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. KOLBE) to lay on the table the appeal of the ruling of the Chair.

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

RECORDED VOTE

Mr. WISE. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

Aderholt

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 216, noes 201, not voting 16, as follows:

[Roll No. 567]

LoBiondo

AYES-216

Ewing Archer Fletcher Lofgren Lucas (OK) Armey Foley Fossella Bachus Manzullo McCollum Baker Fowler Ballenger Franks (NJ) McCrery Barr Frelinghuysen McHugh Barrett (NE) Gallegly McInnis Bartlett Ganske McIntosh Barton Gekas McKeon Bass Gibbons Metcalf Mica Bateman Gilchrest Miller (FL) Biggert Gillmor Bilbray Gilman Miller, Gary Bilirakis Goodlatte Moran (KS) Bliley Goodling Moran (VA) Blunt Goss Morella Boehlert Graham Myrick Nethercutt Boehner Granger Green (WI) Bonilla Ney Bono Greenwood Northup Brady (TX) Gutknecht Nussle Bryant Hall (TX) Burr Hansen Oxlev Hastings (WA) Burton Packard Buyer Hayes Havworth Callahan Pease Peterson (PA) Calvert Hefley Camp Hergei Petri Campbell Hill (MT) Pickering Canady Pitts Hilleary Cannon Hobson Pombo Castle Hoekstra Portman Chabot Pryce (OH) Horn Hostettler Chambliss Quinn Radanovich Coble Houghton Coburn Hulshof Ramstad Collins Hunter Regula Hutchinson Revnolds Combest Cook Hyde Riley Cooksey Isakson Rogan Jenkins Cox Rogers Johnson (CT) Rohrabacher Crane Cubin Johnson, Sam Ros-Lehtinen Cunningham Jones (NC) Roukema Davis (VA) Kelly King (NY) Royce Ryan (WI) Dea1 DeLay Ryun (KS) Kingston DeMint Knollenberg Salmon Diaz-Balart Kolbe Sanford Dickey Kuykendall Saxton Doolittle LaHood Schaffer Sensenbrenner Dreier Largent Duncan Latham Sessions Dunn LaTourette Shadegg Ehlers Lazio Shaw Ehrlich Leach Sherwood Emerson Lewis (CA) Shimkus English Lewis (KY) Shuster Everett Linder Simpson

Smith (MI) Smith (NJ) Smith (TX) Souder Spence Stearns Stump Sununu Sweeney Talent Tancredo

Tauzin Wamp Taylor (NC) Watkins Watts (OK) Terry Thomas Weldon (FL) Thornberry Weldon (PA) Thune Weller Tiahrt Whitfield Wicker Toomey Upton Wilson $\bar{ ext{Vitter}}$ Wolf Walden Young (AK) Young (FL) Walsh NOES-201

Abercrombie Goode Oberstar Ackerman Gordon Obey Allen Green (TX) Olver Andrews Gutierrez Ortiz Baird Hall (OH) Owens Baldacci Hastings (FL) Pallone Hill (IN) Baldwin Pascrell Barcia Pastor Barrett (WI) Hinchev Pelosi Becerra Hinojosa Peterson (MN) Hoeffel Phelps Berkley Holden Pickett Berman Holt Pomeroy Hooley Price (NC) Rishon Hover Rahall Blagojevich Inslee Rangel Blumenauer Jackson (IL) Reves Bonior Jackson-Lee Rivers Borski (TX) Rodriguez Jefferson Boswell Roemer Boucher John Rothman Johnson, E. B. Boyd Roybal-Allard Brady (PA) Jones (OH) Rush Brown (FL) Kaptur Saho Brown (OH) Kennedy Sanchez Kildee Kilpatrick Capps Sanders Capuano Sandlin Cardin Kind (WI) Sawyer Carson Kleczka Schakowsky Clay Klink Scott Clayton Kucinich Serrano Clement LaFalce Sherman Clyburn Lampson Shows Condit Lantos Sisisky Costello Lee Skelton Coyne Levin Slaughter Cramer Lewis (GA) Smith (WA) Crowley Lipinski Snyder Cummings Lowey Spratt Danner Davis (FL) Lucas (KY) Stabenow Luther Davis (IL) Stenholm Maloney (NY) Strickland DeFazio Markey Tanner DeGette Martinez Tauscher Delahunt Mascara Taylor (MS) DeLauro Matsui Thompson (CA) McCarthy (MO) Deutsch Thompson (MS) Dicks McCarthy (NY) Dingell McDermott Tierney Dixon McGovern Doggett Towns McIntyre Traficant Dooley McKinney Turner Udall (CO) McNulty Dovle Edwards Meehan Udall (NM) Meeks (NY) Engel Velazquez Eshoo Menendez Etheridge Vento Millender-Visclosky Evans McDonald Waters Watt (NC) Miller, George Farr Fattah Minge Waxman Filner Mink Forbes Moakley Weiner Ford Mollohan Wexler Frank (MA) Wevgand Moore Murtha Wise Frost Geidenson Nadler Woolsev Gephardt Napolitano Wıı Gonzalez Neal Wvnn

NOT VOTING-16

Scarborough Bereuter Larson Chenoweth-Hage Maloney (CT) Shays Convers Meek (FL) Stark Istook Norwood Stupak Kanjorski Payne Kasich Porter

\Box 1432

So the motion to table was agreed to. The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

PRIVILEGES OF THE HOUSE-CALLING ON PRESIDENT TO AB-RENEGOTIATING FROM STAIN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS GOVERNING ANTIDUMPING LAWS AND COUNTERVAILING MEAS-URES

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Speaker, I rise to a question of the privileges of the House and offer a privileged resolution that I noticed pursuant to rule IX and ask for its immediate consideration.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the resolution.

The Clerk read as follows:

RESOLUTION CALLING ON THE PRESIDENT TO ABSTAIN FROM RENEGOTIATING INTER-NATIONAL AGREEMENTS GOVERNING ANTI-DUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES

Whereas under Art. I, Section 8 of the Constitution, the Congress has power and responsibility with regard to foreign commerce and the conduct of international trade negotiations:

Whereas the House of Representatives is deeply concerned that, in connection with the World Trade Organization, ("WTO") Ministerial meeting to be held in Seattle, Washington, and the multilateral trade negotiations expected to follow, a few countries are seeking to circumvent the agreed list of negotiation topics and reopen debate over the WTO's antidumping and antisubsidy rules;

Whereas the built-in agenda for future WTO negotiations, which was set out in the Uruguay Round package ratified by Congress in 1994, includes agriculture trade, services trade, and intellectual property protection but does not include antidumping antisubsidy rules;

Whereas the Congress has not approved antidumping negotiations or antisubsidy rules and has clearly, but so far informally, signaled its opposition to such negotiations:

strong antidumping Whereas antisubsidy rules are a cornerstone of the liberal trade policy of the United States and are essential to the health of the manufacturing and farm sectors in the United States;

Whereas it has long been and remains the policy of the United States to support its antidumping and antisubsidy laws and to defend those laws in international negotiations:

Whereas an important part of Congress' participation in the formulation of trade policy is the enactment of official negotiating objectives against which completed agreements can be measured when presented for ratification;

Whereas the current absence of official negotiating objectives on the statute books must not be allowed to undermine the Congress' constitutional role in charting the direction of United States trade policy.

Whereas the WTO antidumping antisubsidy rules concluded in the Uruguay Round have scarcely been tested since they entered into effect and certainly have not proved defective;

Whereas opening these rules to renegotiation could only lead to weakening them, which would in turn lead to even greater abuse of the world's open markets, particularly that of the United States;

Whereas conversely, avoiding another divisive fight over these rules is the best way to